Abstract: Researchers’ racial and gender identities influence their outcomes in academia and the field of political science. This letter interrogates how researcher identity affects the research process: specifically elite interview recruitment. Within an ongoing research project we embed a pre-registered audit experiment randomizing the gender of the researcher conducting outreach to estimate whether there are differences in interviews scheduled holding all other confounders constant. We find that when outreach is conducted by a woman, elites are more likely to schedule an interview. This letter contributes to our understanding of bias and inequality during the research process. In addition, our study offers a new approach to audit experiments that limits deception and wasted time for elites.

Abstract: There is a consensus in the finance literature that stock markets generally perform well ahead of holidays. However, I argue that this relationship does not hold in the Chinese context, given that public holidays are associated with increased collective action and repression. I propose two possible mechanisms: (1) Chinese investors take cues from the political environment and will thus act more conservatively in the market prior to public holidays or (2) the government increases intervention to stabilize the stock market during these periods. I test this relationship using daily stock exchange data from Shanghai and Shenzhen. In addition, I corroborate the theoretical mechanism by testing whether there is similar conservatism before focal points on the dissident calendar. This research note contributes to our understanding of the Chinese investment market and raises general questions about the representativeness of the finance literature. In addition, this research speaks to the costs of authoritarianism and preserving social stability in these contexts.

Abstract: How do changes to international tax rules affect how countries promote investment? Countries have historically relied on investment incentives to attract foreign direct investment. However, I argue that the coordination of 138 countries on new international tax rules limits the use of incentives. The agreement directly reduces the benefits of tax incentives and their subsequent use. Governments will be unable to substitute for the decline by increasing the use of cash grants -- particularly in democratic contexts -- because of their political unfavorability and fiscal constraints. As a result, I argue that implementing countries are disadvantaged in the global competition for FDI. Using a difference in difference analysis and a case study of South Korea, I find that firms that are located or headquartered in countries that have implemented international tax rules are less likely to receive incentives. In addition, FDI flows to implementing countries decline after implementation.

Abstract: Within political institutions largely insulated from money in politics and domestic electoral considerations, to what extent are non-state actors able to influence regulations? Many international organizations (IOs) are composed only of state members, but their regulations have far-reaching consequences for non-state actors. This paper sheds new light on the influence of non-state actors, particularly firms, on regulations with a focus on the case of OECD tax evasion regulations. I argue that firms and industry associations work to build positive reputations with bureaucrats through broad based and quality written public comments to further their policy preferences. I present evidence that bureaucrats make decisions in line with these expectations through quantitative analysis of a new dataset of 3349 OECD public comments, natural language processing methods, and 38 in-depth interviews. The results indicate that stakeholder engagement may be a double edged sword: while intended to promote democratic processes and transparency, even these fora are susceptible to strategic firm behavior. However, while well-resourced firms and associations are at an advantage in having their voice heard in the creation of regulations, smaller firms that invest substantially in the process can have an out-sized influence. International taxation also represents a substantively important case of non-state actor influence given the successful coordination of 149 countries on new tax regulations. 

Abstract: Many middle and low income countries have tax treaties in place that are highly exploitative and cause them to lose out on tax revenue, often with former colonizers. In recent years, countries have increasingly renegotiated tax treaties to resolve harmful clauses and improve their tax outcomes. In this project, I ask: why does tax treaty renegotiation occur, and under what conditions are countries able to do so? I argue that low and middle income countries are more likely to renegotiate tax treaties when they are less vulnerable to their developed country partner's potential backlash through changes to aid. Low and middle income countries face the threat of reduced bilateral official development aid if they initiate tax treaty renegotiation, as this process raises costs for their developed country partners. Therefore, I find that the likelihood of renegotiation increases when bilateral official development aid decreases and the number of unique donors increases. However, I do not find evidence for alternative arguments that domestic changes to tax revenue are associated with the timing of renegotiation. These results illustrate an additional pathway by which aid is politically motivated and demonstrate a potentially unexpected benefit of new donors. 

Abstract: The rise of industrial policy has led to a global increase in the use of investment incentives. However, new international agreement on taxation will limit the benefits of tax incentives and will reshape how politicians and bureaucrats recruit investment. Therefore, in this paper, I ask: How do the features of investment incentive programs affect the support of voters and policymakers? I argue that the policy instrument, firm nationality, and job creation impact public support for investment incentives. I also expect that politicians will provide incentives in line with voters' preferences to maximize credit claiming benefits. I test these theoretical expectations through a survey experiment of 3753 Americans and an extension of a field experiment of 3117 municipal governments. I find that voters are more likely to support incentives to US firms that create more jobs. There are heterogeneous effects by partisanship for the policy instrument: Democrats are more supportive of cash grants and Republicans are more supportive of tax incentives. Finally, I find that elected politicians provide incentives that reflect their assumption of voters' preferences on the policy instrument. This paper contributes to our understanding of industrial policy and economic pandering.

Abstract: This edited volume addresses geo-economic strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, exploring both the theoretical and thematic contours of this concept and issue-specific dynamics in the areas of finance, trade, energy, and technology competition. Chapters focus on the impact of renewed great power competition between Washington and Beijing in the Indo-Pacific region across these four areas. Each addresses central concerns for the future of the global economic order and offers a lens to understand interstate competition in light of the geopolitical shifts resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Written by an international panel of experts, this volume provides a cohesive view of the region's most pressing issues. As such, it will be relevant to scholars specializing in Indo-Pacific domestic politics and foreign policy, U.S. foreign policy, middle powers, China-U.S. relations, China-EU relations, Asia-Pacific developments, international security, international political economy, and emerging markets.