Abstract: Within political institutions insulated from money in politics and domestic electoral considerations, to what extent are non-state actors able to influence regulations? Many international organizations (IOs) are composed only of state members, but their regulations have far-reaching consequences for non-state actors. This paper sheds new light on the influence of non-state actors, particularly firms, on regulations with a focus on the case of OECD tax evasion regulations. I argue that firms and industry associations work to build positive reputations with bureaucrats through broad based and quality written public comments to further their policy preferences. I present evidence that bureaucrats make decisions in line with these expectations through quantitative analysis of a new dataset of 3349 OECD public comments, natural language processing methods, and 33 in-depth interviews. The results indicate that stakeholder engagement may be a double edged sword: while intended to democratize access to the policymaking process, even these fora are susceptible to strategic firm behavior. However, while well-resourced firms and associations are at an advantage in having their voice heard in the creation of regulations, smaller firms that invest substantially in the process can have an out-sized influence. International taxation also represents a substantively important case of non-state actor influence given the successful coordination of 148 countries on new tax regulations.

Abstract: Researchers’ racial and gender identities influence their outcomes in academia and the field of political science. This letter interrogates how researcher identity affects the research process: specifically elite interview recruitment. Within an ongoing research project we embed a pre-registered audit experiment randomizing the gender of the researcher conducting outreach to estimate whether there are differences in interviews scheduled holding all other confounders constant. We find that when outreach is conducted by a woman, elites are more likely to schedule an interview. This letter contributes to our understanding of bias and inequality during the research process. In addition, our study offers a new approach to audit experiments that limits deception and wasted time for elites.

Abstract: There is a consensus in the finance literature that stock markets generally perform well ahead of holidays. However, I argue that this relationship does not hold in the Chinese context, given that public holidays are associated with increased collective action and repression. I propose two possible mechanisms: (1) Chinese investors take cues from the political environment and will thus act more conservatively in the market prior to public holidays or (2) the government increases intervention to stabilize the stock market during these periods. I test this relationship using daily stock exchange data from Shanghai and Shenzhen. In addition, I corroborate the theoretical mechanism by testing whether there is similar conservatism before focal points on the dissident calendar. This research note contributes to our understanding of the Chinese investment market and raises general questions about the representativeness of the finance literature. In addition, this research speaks to the costs of authoritarianism and preserving social stability in these contexts.

Abstract: How do changes to international tax rules affect how countries promote investment? Countries have historically relied on investment incentives to attract foreign direct investment. However, I argue that the coordination of 138 countries on new international tax rules limits the use of incentives. The agreement directly reduces the benefits of tax incentives and their subsequent use. Governments will be unable to substitute for the decline by increasing the use of cash grants -- particularly in democratic contexts -- because of their political unfavorability and fiscal constraints. As a result, I argue that implementing countries are disadvantaged in the global competition for FDI. Using a difference in difference analysis and a case study of South Korea, I find that firms that are located or headquartered in countries that have implemented international tax rules are less likely to receive incentives. In addition, FDI flows to implementing countries decline after implementation.

Abstract: The rise of industrial policy has led to a global increase in the use of investment incentives. How do the features of investment incentive programs affect the support of voters and policymakers? I argue that the policy instrument, firm nationality, and job creation impact public support for investment incentives. I test these theoretical expectations through two pre-registered survey experiments of 1693 and 3753 Americans and a pre-registered extension of a field experiment of 3117 municipal governments. I corroborate the experimental results by analyzing FDI project-level data. I find that voters are more likely to support the use of tax breaks, relative to cash grants. When the costs of these two policy instruments are concrete, there is no significant difference. Voters are also more likely to support incentives to domestic firms and projects that create more jobs. Finally, I find that elected politicians provide incentives that reflect these voter preferences.

Abstract: Many middle and low income countries have tax treaties in place that are highly exploitative and cause them to lose out on tax revenue. In recent years, countries have increasingly renegotiated tax treaties to resolve harmful clauses and improve their tax outcomes. In this project, I ask: why does tax treaty renegotiation occur, and under what conditions are countries able to do so? I argue that low and middle income countries are more likely to renegotiate tax treaties when they are less vulnerable to potential backlash from their high-income treaty partner. The renegotiation of tax treaties reduces the taxing rights and subsequent revenue of the high-income country, incentivizing them to deter renegotiations and preserve the status quo. One avenue for potential retaliation is through changes to bilateral official development aid. Therefore, when bilateral aid dependency is high, low and middle income countries are less likely to renegotiate. In contrast, when this threat attenuates and dependence on a particular donor decreases, there is a higher likelihood of renegotiation. I test these theoretical expectations with panel data on bilateral aid dependency and a two-stage least squares instrumental variables analysis that leverages the exogenous timing of UNSC temporary seats. I find that the likelihood of tax treaty renegotiation increases when bilateral aid dependency decreases and the number of unique donors increases. These results illustrate an additional pathway by which aid is politically motivated and demonstrate a potentially unexpected benefit of new donors.

Abstract: This edited volume addresses geo-economic strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, exploring both the theoretical and thematic contours of this concept and issue-specific dynamics in the areas of finance, trade, energy, and technology competition. Chapters focus on the impact of renewed great power competition between Washington and Beijing in the Indo-Pacific region across these four areas. Each addresses central concerns for the future of the global economic order and offers a lens to understand interstate competition in light of the geopolitical shifts resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Written by an international panel of experts, this volume provides a cohesive view of the region's most pressing issues. As such, it will be relevant to scholars specializing in Indo-Pacific domestic politics and foreign policy, U.S. foreign policy, middle powers, China-U.S. relations, China-EU relations, Asia-Pacific developments, international security, international political economy, and emerging markets.